China’s approach to India’s NSG entry – predicting Beijing’s block
The Middle East is now the region where many of the most significant shifts in China’s global security role are underway
China’s public offer to mediate peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government marks a notable departure in Chinese foreign policy. It is the first time Beijing is taking a genuine leadership role, on its own initiative, on a geopolitical issue both sensitive and significant.
in spite of the top three global actors engaging across a complex range of political, economic, and military issues, a greater degree of joint purpose and collaborative response remains elusive.
Andrew Small discussed China’s role in neighboring Afghanistan with the Danish political news magazine RÆSON.
The last few months have been rife with speculation about Beijing’s willingness to fill the void if American financial and military support for Pakistan were to be curtailed. Far from brimming with strategic potential, the China-Pakistan relationship is now increasingly pushing up against its limits.
The patchwork of initiatives established between NATO and Asia has never been framed by any overarching region-specific rationale. Insofar as there is a strategic imperative driving outreach in the region, it has been an effort to draw in „global partners“ into closer cooperation with existing alliance operations – primarily in Afghanistan – rather than any broader process of identifying shared security concerns either with the major Asian powers or even with traditional partners in the region.
Although the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan looks like a prime candidate for closer cooperation between the United States and China, prospects of pursuing complementary policies will remain limited until China fundamentally reappraises its strategy for dealing with extremism in the region.
The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue capped off a three-month period that has returned the Sino-U.S. relationship to a state of fragile equilibrium. Strategic mistrust remains pervasive and there are few issues on which the two sides genuinely see eye-to-eye. But the missteps of 2009 provided some important lessons for better management of future differences.
On Wednesday, China and Pakistan signed pacts on cooperation in agriculture, healthcare, justice, media, economy, and technology. Both sides also vowed to step up joint efforts against terrorism. But while the relationship between the two countries is strong, it’s shadowed by Beijing’s concerns about Pakistan’s security threat and its impact on Chinese investment and personnel in Pakistan.
In Asia’s major capitals, the last few years have seen marked shifts in perspectives on the European Union. Not so long ago the EU was viewed as everything from a rising political power to a model for regional order. The combination of economic stagnation and the painful process of fixing the EU’s institutional arrangements has been part of the problem.
„We have moved from a narrative, which lasted for years, that everything was fine when it wasn’t to a narrative that everything is going wrong when it isn’t.” This lament from a former Western official, who, like others quoted in this piece, did not speak for attribution, summed up the frustrations of many in Kabul about the growing disconnect between the political timetables inside and outside the country. The concern is not only that the various transition deadlines are unrealistic, but that their very existence is creating counterproductive pressures that will make them even harder to achieve.
In the run-up to the G-20 summit, China has tried to placate the United States with a revaluation of its currency. But the move is not a real change of course, explains the German Marshall Fund’s Andrew Small in a Spiegel Online interview. He argues that the Chinese leadership is more concerned with deflecting external criticism than with the health of the global economy.
While the U.S. Treasury’s decision on whether to label China a currency manipulator is inevitably political in nature, rarely has it ever been so geopolitically loaded. In previous years, it has mainly been the economic relationship at stake. This time the implications run from Middle Eastern security to nuclear proliferation, and will do much to define the broader shape of the U.S.-China relationship in the coming years.
The United States and China have grown so powerful that people around the world speak reverentially of a „G-2.“ But there are cracks in the alliance, as the German Marshall Fund’s Andrew Small explains in a Spiegel Online interview. Frustration is growing in the United States over Beijing’s lack of cooperation on economic issues.
It was once said of Fidel Castro that his „stomach is in Moscow but his heart is in Beijing.“ Now the opposite seems to be true.
China is often accused of supporting a string of despots, nuclear proliferators, and genocidal regimes, shielding them from international pressure and thus reversing progress on human rights and humanitarian principles. But over the last two years, Beijing has been quietly overhauling its policies toward pariah states.
China is often accused of supporting a string of despots, nuclear proliferators, and genocidal regimes, shielding them from international pressure and thus reversing progress on human rights and humanitarian principles. But over the last two years, Beijing has been quietly overhauling its policies toward pariah states.
For Europe and China alike, the most important bilateral relationship is with the United States. Although often described as a ‘strategic triangle’, neither the Chinese impact on the transatlantic relationship nor Europe’s role in the Sino-US relationship is remotely comparable to the significance of the United States for the Sino-European relationship.
China, which once perceived the West’s condemnation of Mugabe and sanctions against his regime as an economic opportunity, now views its involvement in Zimbabwe as a liability both for its investments and its international reputation.
We are getting used to seeing new faces of Chinese diplomacy and on President Hu Jintao’s latest trip to Africa we will see the unlikeliest of all. In making his most visible push for the settlement of the Darfur crisis, Hu will signal a quiet revolution in Chinese attitudes to sovereignty and noninterference, and position China as the protector of the repressed citizens of the region.